US military resources actually aren't infinite
And our NATO allies have helped fill the gaps, including in the Persian Gulf
The understandable decisions by some NATO countries not to let the Trump Administration drag them into the Iran war have been met with loads of anti-NATO vitriol from Trumpworld. It’s really not surprising, though I am struck by how eager people who should know better, such as former Republican Member of Congress Peter Meijer, have been to display their ignorance of what the Atlantic Alliance is and how it for decades benefited the US, as well as Canada and the European allies. There are plenty of positive answers, for example, to the rhetorical question “What have the European allies ever done for the US?” One just needs to know some history.
An interesting case in point involves the Persian Gulf. The Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988 included attacks on shipping in the Persian Gulf. Protecting the transit of commercial vessels from ship attacks and from mines was the objective of a multinational naval operation involving Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK, as well as the United States, from late 1987 to late 1988. Though NATO countries were involved, however, it was not a NATO operation. The mine-clearing part of the operation, for example, functioned informally, through on-scene coordination among naval units, without a dedicated command.
Regrettably, on April 14, 1988, the USS Samuel B. Roberts, a US Navy frigate cruising in the Gulf, did strike an Iranian mine, which ripped a 15-foot hole in her hull. Ten US sailors were injured but all fortunately survived. The US response was to knock out half the Iranian navy in a single day. It was possible to complete the mine-clearing after the Iran-Iraq ceasefire in August 1988. The UN was charged with guaranteeing ceasefire implementation, and mine-clearing was an international effort.
As Emma Salisbury reminds us in her recent, aptly titled analysis “The Mine Gap: America Forgot How to Sweep the Sea,” the US long has relied on its European allies to provide mine countermeasures (MCM) vessels. NATO’s Standing Mine Countermeasures Group, for example, has been operating since 1973, drawing its ships primarily from European allies, notably Belgium and the Netherlands. Italy also has had important MCM capabilities, e.g. carrying out mine-clearing in the Red Sea in 1984. The Gulf War of 1990-1991 featured naval operations including 35 countries under US command but under UN auspices, including once again Belgian, Italian, and Dutch minesweepers.
Weak US interest in MCM was again evident recently when the Navy decommissioned its last four Avenger-class mine countermeasures vessels in the Middle East in September 2025. Ironically, they arrived at the Philadelphia shipyard for scrapping just as reports of Iranian mines in the Strait of Hormuz surfaced.
Since the US “has not confronted [its] capability gap” in mine countermeasures and its “operational limitations are well documented,” it would be sensible to ensure that allied countries remain willing to fill these gaps. But that is not the way of the Trump Administration, which loves berating allies.
I remember personally how, back in the 1980s, the US government was approaching its potential partners in Persian Gulf security: with enormous respect, collegiality, and gratitude, especially when it came to capabilities that we ourselves had difficulty providing. To work together, you have to talk openly about the challenges, share ideas about approaches, and listen carefully to what your potential partners have to say. Everybody’s interests and concerns need to be respected.
And there is no point to arguing that NATO allies “helped us once in the Persian Gulf and are obligated to do it again.” Italy, for example, sent a naval contingent to the Gulf in response to a September 1987 Iranian Revolutionary Guard attack on an Italian-flagged container ship. France had broken relations with Iran after a July 1987 attack on a French container ship, initiating what the French termed Operation Prometheus. These countries were acting in their national self-interest, though they naturally coordinated and collaborated with fellow NATO countries that were doing the same. One of NATO’s strengths is that member countries constantly practice joint operations and military coordination and understand each other’s procedures well. France was not part of the NATO military structure in the 1980s but was nonetheless familiar with NATO practices.
The European allies had not decided that assisting US attacks on Iran was in their national interests when the US made its peremptory demands. For assistance that would have signified European participation in the US/Israeli war against Iran. As usual these days, we showed no readiness to consult, to seek common ground and collaboration, to understand the national interests of others (not just ourselves) and avoid poisoning the well. Sad times for those of us who have devoted our lives to transatlantic cooperation.
