It's not the same old National Security Strategy
They haven't been domestic policy documents in the past
It’s fair to ask whether the new US National Security Strategy (NSS), noted for its dramatic dissing of our European allies, is really all that new. Conservative British commentator Niall Ferguson sees nothing new under the sun, just standard bureaucratic sausage-making. But I disagree.
The NSS posits a civilizational divide within what we used to call the West. Previous such documents have dealt in divides, but normally in divides between democratic and autocratic spheres. The notion that Europe and the United States are fundamentally different, and that the former needs to follow the social and political guidance of the latter or else face civilizational collapse, is not a standard feature of US national security documents.
To an unprecedented degree, the new NSS links international relations to the internal debate in the US over what our political system, society, and culture should look like. The October 2022, i.e. Biden-era, National Security Strategy most certainly did not include anything like the call in its 2025 successor for “growing numbers of strong, traditional families that raise healthy children.” Why does a national security document need to say, “We want an America that cherishes its past glories and its heroes, and that looks forward to a new golden age”?
In a national security document that is also a statement on US domestic politics, Europe is set up as the foil, as what the United States must not become. Europe is described as being at risk of losing its European identity and becoming “unrecognizable.” Creativity, industriousness, and freedom supposedly are undermined.
In previous national security strategies, the fundamental affinity of Europe and the US was always a given. Europeans were not told what path they had to follow. Now, highlighting differences has assumed a central role.
The difference in tone between the December 2017 Trump National Security Strategy and the current iteration, for example, is remarkable. In 2017, the section on Europe began with the following: “A strong and free Europe is of vital importance to the United States. We are bound together by our shared commitment to the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. Together, we rebuilt Western Europe after World War II and created institutions that produced stability and wealth on both sides of the Atlantic. Today, Europe is one of the most prosperous regions in the world and our most significant trading partner.” We’ve come a long way in eight years, and not in a good direction.
The Europeans I talk to clearly perceive that something intentionally new is going on with the 2025 NSS. And they’re right. Going back to Trump 1.0, European leaders have believed they can mollify the US president and garner his sympathy by offering praise and expressing admiration. It may be dawning on the Europeans that this is not an effective strategy, interpreted on the US side as a sign of weakness, and thus met at the practical level with disdain. How to get to a different, more incisive European approach to the US, however, is a difficult challenge, involving choices that Europeans understandably have hoped could be avoided. Political leaders are not yet at the point of overt fist pounding and door slamming.
From a US perspective, throwing traditional allies under the bus while the US military regrettably is thrust into the position of committing crimes does not make us look like a desirable security partner. The political opposition in the US does not seem very focused on foreign policy matters, but the recent Reagan National Defense Survey poll showing heightened public support for NATO and Ukraine is worthy of attention. Sometimes voters do care about foreign and security policy.